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American society is becoming increasingly diverse. At the same time, the
federal judiciary continues to be predominantly White. What difference does this
make? This article offers an empirical answer to that question through an
extensive study of workplace racial harassment cases. It finds that judges of
different races reach different conclusions, with non-African American judges
less likely to hold for the plaintiffs. It also finds that plaintiffs of different races
fare differently, with African Americans the most likely to lose and Hispanics the
most likely to be successful. Finally, countering the formalism model’s tenet that
judges are color-blind, the results suggest that judges of one race are more likely
to hold for plaintiffs of the same race, suggesting a tendency toward insider
group preferences. These findings illustrate the complex race dynamics in
judicial decision-making and the consequences of a judiciary that does not reflect
the citizenry’s racial diversity. The article concludes that an integrated judiciary
would be more responsive and accountable to society, while still exercising its
principled decision-making.
* Pat Chew, J.D., M.Ed., is the Judge J. Quint Salmon and Anne Salmon Chaired Professor and Distinguished Faculty Scholar at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. Robert Kelley, Ph.D., teaches at Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of
Business and is the President of Consultants to Executives and Organizations
(CEO), a management consulting firm. We thank Laurel Chiappetta for her invaluable statistical consultation. We also thank the many judges and academics at various conferences and workshops who offered valuable feedback on our work.
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INTRODUCTION

Given all the media attention dedicated to race, affirmative action,
post-racial politics, and political correctness, it would not be surprising
that people believe that the judiciary is diverse and that minorities fare
well in the judicial system. The reality is more complicated and less
heartening. For example, the federal judiciary remains predominantly
White at 83% versus 17% minority composition.1 Of these minority
judges, the largest group is African American, followed by Hispanic, and
Asian American at a distant third.2 To put these percentages in a broader
context, the cumulative 17% minority representation is not proportional
to the minorities in the general population, which is double at approximately 34%.3 In fact, both the percentages of minority judges and minority lawyers4 are not reflective of American society’s racial composition,
with minority lawyers even more underrepresented than minority judges.
So, although more minority judges sit on the federal bench today than
fifty years ago,5 providing evidence of progress within the last half century, it still is a long way from representing the faces of America.
Unfortunately, diversification of the judiciary has stalled in more recent decades. Consider, for instance, that appointments of all racial minority judges in the George H. W. Bush administration added up to
10.2%,6 in the William Clinton administrations 24.6%,7 and in the George
1. The descriptive statistics on federal judges in this article are based on calculations of
information available from the comprehensive “History of the Federal Judiciary”
database available through the Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/research_categories.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Federal Judicial Center]. This website provides biographical data about the federal
judiciary, including judges’ race and gender, party of the nominating president,
commission date, and service status (active, senior, sitting). The statistics cited here
on current White and minority composition, for instance, were obtained by a search
of the “race or ethnicity” and “query limited to sitting judges” categories.
2. Id. African Americans constitute 5.2%, Hispanics 3.1%, and Asian Americans 0.71%
of the federal bench.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Age: 2000 and
2008, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2010: THE NATIONAL DATA
BOOK 13 tbl.9 (129th ed. 2010). Based on the percentage representations of these
groups of the total in 2008: 12.8% Black or African American alone; 1% American
Indian, Alaska Native alone; 4.6% Asian alone and Native Hawaiian, Other Pacific
Islander alone; and 15.4% Hispanic origin alone, all totaling 33.8%.
4. Black, Asian, and Hispanic lawyers constitute 11.3% of total lawyers. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 3, at 387 tbl.603 (“Employed Civilians by Occupation, Sex, Race,
and Hispanic Origin: 2008”).
5. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 1. These statistics were obtained by searching the
“race or ethnicity” and “confirmation date before Feb. 1, 1962” categories, showing
five African American and one Hispanic judge in 1962. A search of “race or ethnicity” and “query limited to sitting judges” categories resulted in 120 African American, 83 Hispanic, and 17 Asian American judges as of Feb. 1, 2012.
6. Id. Of these appointments, 5.9% were African American and 4.3% were Hispanic.
There were no Asian American or American Indian appointments. The data for
these statistics were obtained by a search of the “nominating president” and “race
or ethnicity” of the judges categories.
7. Id. Of these appointments, 16.6% were African American, 6.3% were Hispanic, 1.4%
were Asian American, and 0.3% American Indian.
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W. Bush administrations 17.9%.8 However, President Barack Obama has
made a considerable effort to reverse this trend, diversifying the federal
judiciary more than any other President.9 In its first three years, the
Obama administration contrasted dramatically with its predecessors,
with minorities totaling 36.6% of all of appointments.10 Thus, while 75%
to 90% of his predecessors’ appointments were White, less than twothirds of Obama’s appointments are of that racial background.
Exactly what would having more judges of color mean? A judiciary
whose racial composition more closely reflects society’s racial composition has important symbolic value,11 and this symbolism would not go
unnoticed. Journalist Mike Green puts it this way: “If people of all races
are to believe in judicial fairness, a more diverse bench is a good place to
start.”12 As recent events illustrate, race and its relationship to fairness in
the U.S. justice system continue to be a hot-button issue.13
8. Id. Of these appointments, 7.4% were African American, 9.3% were Hispanic, and
1.2% were Asian American. There were no American Indian appointments.
9. These judicial appointments have not occurred without political difficulties and
controversies. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President’s List for Judgeships,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/
screening-panel-rejects-many-obama-picks-for-federal-judgeships.html (noting that
the American Bar Association (ABA) has disqualified a higher percentage of
Obama’s nominations than those of Presidents Clinton or George W. Bush). See also
Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html; Carolina A. Miranda,
Just What is a ‘Wise Latina,’ Anyway?, TIME, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.
time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1910403,00.html; Sotomayor “Wise Latina”
Quote — Not Very Wise, COMMON SENSE LOST?, (July 12, 2009, 11:33 AM), http://
commonsense-wherehasitgone.blogspot.com/2009/07/sotomayor-wise-latina.html;
and Charles H. Green, Sotomayor Was Right the First Time: A Wise Latina Does Know
More, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2009, 7:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/charles-h-green/sotomayor-was-right-the-f_b_245216.html (accounting the
controversy over the nomination of now-Justice Sonia Sotomayor).
10. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 1. Of these appointments, 18.3% were African
American, 11.9% were Hispanic, and 6.4% were Asian American. There were no
American Indian appointments.
11. Researchers label these symbolic and substantive values differently. See, e.g.,
Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010) (calling symbolic value “social
legitimacy” and calling substantive value “participation and perspective” among
other descriptions); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the
U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 299, 301–02 (2004) (calling symbolic value “descriptive
representation”).
12. Mike Green, Report: Race Matters in Judicial Decision-Making, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 13, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-green/report-racematters-in-ju_b_461526.html.
13. Two examples illustrate. The first is the controversy over now-Justice Sonia
Sotomayor’s comments about the “wise Latina,” supra note 9. See Race & Gender of
Judges Make Enormous Differences in Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. J. L. NEWS NOW,
Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/race_gender_of_judges_
make_enormous_differences_in_rulings_studies_find_aba/ (news article on the
study). The second is the considerable interest in the legal community over an empirical study finding that judges’ race made a significant difference in outcomes in
racial harassment cases. See Molly McDonough, 10 Most Popular Posts: Race & Gender of Judges; Why Lawyers Should Work Less; & Lawyers in Trouble, A.B.A. J. L. NEWS
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Nonetheless, does a more racially diverse judiciary actually have
“substantive value,” thus altering jurisprudential content and judicial decision-making? Would case outcomes change, and if so, would they
change for judges and plaintiffs of particular races?
Emerging empirical research has produced some answers. For instance, a half-dozen studies indicate that White judges and African American judges have different decision-making patterns in employment
discrimination cases.14 In criminal law cases, however, the results are
mixed, with some showing racial differences between White and African
American judges and others finding no differences.15 This research on
judges’ race focuses almost exclusively on White judges and African
American judges, with very little exploration of judges of other races and
ethnicities. Furthermore, while studies of criminal law cases have also
considered how the defendants’ race relates to case outcomes,16 very little
research exists on how the plaintiffs’ race in civil cases, including discrimination, affects case outcomes.17

14.

15.

16.
17.

NOW, Dec. 28, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/most_read_in_2010
(noting that the “Race and Gender . . . ” article was the most viewed ABA online
article for that year.)
The majority of studies of judges’ race in civil rights cases (including employment
discrimination cases) found differences in the decision-making patterns of federal
judges of different races. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind
Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117
(2009); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Sarah Westergren, Note: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited:
The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689 (2004); Kenneth L. Manning, ¿Como Decide?:
Decision-Making by Latino Judges in the Federal Courts (Apr. 14, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors); Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971–1999 (Mar. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors); Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with authors).
In contrast, a minority of studies did not find race differences. See Farhang &
Wawro, supra note 11; Carol T. Kulik, Elissa L. Perry, & Molly B. Pepper, Here Comes
the Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment
Case Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69 (2003); Tajuana Massie et al., The Impact
of Gender and Race in the Decisions of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals (Apr. 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); Jennifer A.
Segal, Representative Decision-Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137 (2000).
Some studies have also considered other judicial characteristics, such as judges’
political ideology, and gender to see how these characteristics interact with the
judges’ race in predicting case outcomes. See, e.g., Chew & Kelley, supra; Kulik,
supra; Cameron & Cummings, supra.
CASSIA L. SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? 102 (2002). See, e.g., Todd Collins &
Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench, 61 POL.
RES. Q. 219 (2008); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences:
The Effect of District Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (2005) (finding
differences in case outcomes).
See SPOHN, supra note 15, at 101–17.
An exception is Crowe, supra note 14, which considered both the race of the judges
and plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
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This empirical study furthers our understanding in specific ways. To
begin, this is the first study that explores whether the plaintiffs’ race
makes a difference in racial harassment case outcomes.18 Second, while
most research focuses on White versus African American judges, this
study also includes both Hispanic judges and plaintiffs. Hispanics are a
fast growing ethnicity in the federal judiciary, as well as a fast growing
ethnic population in the country.19 Finally, in addition to considering the
plaintiffs’ race and the judges’ race independently of each other, this
study considers the effects of the two variables simultaneously, looking
for the interactions between them and case outcomes. Namely, it explores whether a judge of one race appears to favor or disfavor plaintiffs
of various races.
As subsequently explained, the study’s overall empirical conclusions
are consistent and clear. When considered independently, the plaintiffs’
race matters, and the judges’ race affects whether plaintiffs are successful
or not. Furthermore, there are significant interactive effects, so that the
particular combination of judge’s race and plaintiff’s race makes a difference — signaling a general tendency for a judge of one race to find more
persuasive the claims of a plaintiff of the same race. In the concluding
discussion, this Article explores the implications of these findings, arguing that a more racially integrated judiciary serves important democratic
purposes and ultimately results in more societally responsive and informed decisions.
II. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY
Plaintiff-employees in workplace racial harassment cases allege they
were harassed because of their race, resulting in a “racially hostile” work
environment.20 The authors have discussed at length in earlier works the
legal requirements, jurisprudence, and exhaustive litigation process for
racial harassment claims.21 These racial harassment cases are an important area of law and particularly appropriate for studying the effects of
race in judicial decision making. Thousands of racial harassment complaints are filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
18. Crowe, supra note 14, studied discrimination cases, which may have included some
racial harassment cases. The current study focuses exclusively on racial harassment
cases.
19. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 1 (searching “commission date” by Jan. 1, 2000
and Jan. 1, 2012, the number of commissioned Hispanic judges increased from 50 to
104 in that time period, in comparison to African American judges at 129 to 176);
Conor Doughtery, U.S. Moves Closer to Minority Majority, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 31, 2011,
5:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/08/31/u-s-moves-closer-to-minority-majority/ (describing results of Brookings Institute report on changing racial
demographics, including growth of Hispanic population).
20. Federal racial harassment claims, as a form of workplace race discrimination, are
based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
21. See Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 183, 187–98 (2010)
(describing traditional and emerging racial harassment jurisprudence) [hereinafter
Chew, Seeing]; Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law,
27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 55–63 (2006) (explaining racial harassment law
and dispute resolution process) [hereinafter Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping].
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each year, and the number is on the rise.22 These cases present an intriguing racial triad: the complaining employees are almost always minority
and most typically African American, while the judges presiding over
these cases and the alleged harassers are most often White.23 Thus, most
commonly in these cases, White judges must assess the credibility of African American employees’ perceptions of racial harassment by their White
supervisors or co-workers. The legal inquiries focus specifically on race
in the workplace. Courts require that plaintiffs show their supervisors or
co-workers (1) harassed them so “severely or pervasively” that it altered
their work environment; and (2) that the harassment occurred because of
the plaintiff’s race, and not for some non-race-related reason.24 Thus, the
judge must assess the parties’ depiction of racial dynamics in the workplace to see if these requirements are met. While the Supreme Court has
laid out these fundamental legal principles, it has left much discretion to
federal judges in interpreting them.25
The database in this study consists of all reported racial harassment
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the federal district
courts of six representative circuits between 2002 and 2008.26 In particular, this study analyzes the effects of judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race on
case outcomes. As with all empirical research based on reported judicial
opinions, inherent limitations exist.27 Reported judicial opinions do not
capture all disputes. Some disputes are settled and are never part of the
litigation process. Even if they are part of the litigation process, judges
do not write opinions on all cases and not all written judicial opinions are
included in the reporter systems. On the other hand, judicial opinions
provide valuable insights and are the traditional source for judges’ legal
reasoning and decision-making patterns.
22. Stephanie Armour, Racial Harassment Lawsuits at Work Go Up, USA TODAY, Oct. 26,
2007, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2007-10-25noose-harassment-eeoc_N.htm (noting over 7,000 complaints in one year); EEOC,
Enforcement & Litigation Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). See also Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping,
supra note 21, at 51 n.4 (citing research documenting racial harassment in the
workplace).
23. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 1143.
24. See the trilogy of Supreme Court cases laying out key legal principles for discriminatory harassment claim, including racial harassment: Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). See also Chew, Seeing, supra note 21, at 187–91
(explaining these cases). In addition, employers can argue affirmative defenses.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 72 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
25. See Chew, Seeing, supra note 21, at 187–91.
26. Searching both LEXIS and WESTLAW, all racial harassment cases in the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits were identified. These circuits were
selected because they represented circuits from all regions of the United States and
included large, racially diverse populations. Cases that had multiple plaintiffs and
uncertain procedural outcomes (i.e., not clearly a plaintiff win or loss) were not included in the statistical analysis.
27. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 62–63 (further explaining that only a very small
percentage of original complaints result in a published judicial opinion).
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Also keep in mind that the vast majority of cases (89%) in this study
dealt with the defendant-employers’ motions for summary judgment.28
While the courts’ rulings on motions for summary judgment are not technically the final resolution of the disputes, the courts’ granting of the employers’ motions are a significant rebuff of plaintiffs’ cases. It prevents
them from proceeding to a trial, unless plaintiffs are able to obtain appellate reversals of the district courts’ decisions. Plaintiffs’ successes at the
appellate level, however, are unlikely.29 Thus, this study considered the
courts’ granting of the employer-defendants’ motions for summary judgment a “plaintiff loss.”
The effective meaning of the courts’ denials of the employers’ motions,
on the other hand, is less certain.30 The plaintiff-employees can technically proceed to trial, where they may ultimately succeed or fail on the
cases’ merits. In practice, the denial of the employers’ motions likely
prompts employers to actively engage plaintiffs in settlement negotiations. Plaintiff-employees view both possibilities positively, and, therefore, this study considered the court’s denial of the employer-defendants’
motions a “plaintiff success.”
As discussed below, standard statistical analyses were used to study
the database, including descriptive statistics, chi-square analyses, and logistic regression analyses.31 While a range of established research methods for this type of research are available to scholars, these methods are
widely accepted.32
Since statistical terms and concepts are less common in the legal literature than in social science literature, a brief primer here assists the reader.
More detailed technical explanations are provided in the footnotes.33 In
addition to basic descriptive statistics (e.g., the number and percentage of
the cases where plaintiffs were successful), other statistical methods are
28. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of
Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES
835, 839 (2004) (noting few civil cases go to trial; rather, most are disposed of
through pretrial motions, most commonly motions for summary judgment). “To
survive a defense motion for summary judgment” and proceed to trial, the plaintiff
“must convince the judge that . . . a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility conflicts against the employer, could render a
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 840. If the plaintiff provides evidence “sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact” on any element, the judge is supposed to deny the defendant’s motion. Id. As Krieger explains, in deciding
summary motions, judges use their intuition “to determine what inferences can
‘reasonably’ be drawn from any particular set of facts.” Id.
29. See Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping, supra note 21, at 90 tbl.15 (indicating only 24.5% of
employee-plaintiffs were successful at the appellate level).
30. See supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS. S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 248–64, 300–09, 345–50, 405, 418, 421, 425 (2010) (describing
chi-square and logistic regression modeling and their use in these kinds of studies);
PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS 115–210 (2010)
(discussing generally the use of statistics in legal and policy problem-solving).
32. LAWLESS ET. AL., supra note 31.
33. See infra note 35 (discussing logistic regressions) and note 55 (discussing multiple
logistic regression modeling).
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commonly used to further interpret the meaning and consequences of
these numbers and percentages. Chi-square tests and logistic regression
modeling, in particular, are statistical methods used to determine the
probability of some occurrence. For instance, the descriptive statistics
may show a difference between the decision- making patterns of African
American judges versus all other judges. The results of chi square testing
and logistic regression modeling reveals whether something meaningful
is occurring (often referred to as statistical significance) or if this difference between African American judges and all other judges is merely
happening by chance.34
The usual marker of statistical significance is a probability (“p”) value
of less than .05 (typically written as p<.05), meaning the difference would
occur less than five times out of one hundred times. In other words, it is
not very likely to happen; or stated another way, the difference is not
occurring by chance and therefore is considered statistically significant. If
the p value is even less, then the difference is even more significant. For
example, p less than .01 (p <.01) means that this difference would occur
only one time out of one hundred instances. . The p less than .05 cutoff is
not sacrosanct. In some cases, it may be reasonable to relax the standard
due to various factors, such as small sample size. In other cases, one may
want it to be more stringent. However, most researchers use the .05 cutoff. Thus, if the p value is greater than .05, the occurrence (i.e., the difference between judges’ decision-making patterns) is considered to be
happening by chance — the difference is not meaningfully significant.
In addition to providing another check of p values, logistic regression
modeling yields odds ratios (“OR”). OR gives an idea of how dramatically one’s “odds” increase or decrease in given situations, for instance,
the probability of a plaintiff-employee being successful before a White
judge. To illustrate, an OR of 2.0 would indicate that it is twice as likely
as normal for that event to occur. As we move through the study’s findings on the relationship between plaintiffs’ race, judges’ race, and case
outcomes, the relevant p values indicating statistical significance and OR
indicating odds of an event occurring are provided and discussed.
III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Overall, plaintiff-employees find it very difficult to succeed in their
racial harassment claims, while employer-defendants are much more
likely to be successful. Out of 473 judicial opinions on racial harassment
claims, plaintiffs were successful only 22.2% of the time, while defendants
were successful in over three out of four cases. This 22.2% is the baseline
against which cases with certain characteristics (e.g., cases brought by
plaintiffs of a particular race or cases heard by judges of a particular race)
are compared.
The following discussion begins with the findings on the effect of the
plaintiffs’ race on case outcomes, is followed by the findings on the effect
34. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 31, at 141–46 (further explaining the concept of statistical significance).
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of the judges’ race, and concludes with the interactive effects of the
judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race.
A. Plaintiffs’ Race Matters
This empirical study is the first to consider the relationship between
the plaintiffs’ race and case outcomes in racial harassment cases. While
members of any racial group can bring racial harassment claims, African
American employees brought 74% of these claims under federal employment discrimination laws. Hispanics, Whites, and Asian Americans were
plaintiffs in the remaining 26% of the cases in this study.
As shown in Table 1, the first finding is that success rates vary among
plaintiffs of different racial groups. While all groups are less likely to win
than to lose, Hispanic (37.3%) plaintiffs have the highest success rates. In
contrast, Asian American (4.3%) and African American (20.7%) plaintiffs
have substantially lower success rates. These differences among plaintiff
groups are statistically significant (p=.009), indicating that these differences are not occurring by chance. The comparatively high Hispanic win
rate and the comparatively low Asian American win rate primarily drives
this significance. In contrast to plaintiffs’ race, the gender of plaintiffs
was not significant to case outcomes with males and females succeeding
at the same 22.2% rate.
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JUDGES’ CHARACTERISTICS

Comparisons
All Cases

Plaintiffs
Successful
N
%
105

22.2

BY

CASE OUTCOMES

Plaintiffs
Unsuccessful
N
%
368

Significance
Levels
(p)

77.8

Plaintiffs’ Characteristics
(Test on plaintiffs’ race is 3 degrees of freedom)
African American plaintiffs vs. all others
African American (n = 352)
Others (n = 121)
Hispanic plaintiffs vs. all others
Hispanic (n = 51)
Others (n = 422)
Asian American plaintiffs vs. all others
Asian American (n = 23)
Others (n = 450)
White plaintiffs vs. all others
White (n = 47)
Others (n = 426)
Sex of plaintiffs (Female vs. male)
Female (n =185)
Male (n = 288)

0.009**
0.19
73
32

20.7
26.4

279
89

79.3
73.6

19
86

37.3
20.4

32
336

62.7
79.6

1
104

4.3
23.1

22
346

95.7
76.9

12
93

25.5
21.8

35
333

74.5
78.2

41
64

22.2
22.2

144
224

77.8
77.8

0.006**
0.035*
0.56

0.99

Judges’ Characteristics
(Test on judges’ race is 3 degrees of freedom)
African American judges vs. all others
African American judge (n = 45)
Others (n = 428)
Hispanic judges vs. all others
Hispanic judge (n = 32)
Others (n = 441)
Asian American judges vs. all others
Asian American judge (n = 3)
Others (n = 470)
White judges vs. all others
White judge (n = 393)
Others (n = 80)
Age at time of Case (Mean ± SD)
Experience at time of Case (Mean ± SD)
Sex of judges (female vs. male)
Female judges (n =105)
Male judges (n = 368)
Political Affiliation of judges
Republican judge (n = 239)
Democratic judge (n = 234)

0.01*
0.001**
19
86

42.2
20.1

26
342

57.8
79.9

5
100

15.6
22.7

27
341

84.4
77.3

0
105

0.0
22.3

3
365

100.0
77.7

81
24

20.6
30.0

312
56

79.4
70.0

0.35
1.00
0.07

60.2 ± 8.8
12.9 ± 8.4

60.7 ± 9.5
12.4 ± 9.1

0.60
0.60
0.85

24
81

22.9
22.0

81
287

77.1
78.0

53
52

22.2
22.2

186
182

77.8
77.8

0.99

**<0.01
* <0.05

Logistic regression analyses on plaintiffs’ race provide further details
on how the plaintiffs’ race matters.35 While the chi-square analyses
shown in Table 1 compare plaintiffs of each race with all other plaintiffs,
35. Logistic regressions allow us to quantify the strength of each association by providing estimates of the odds ratios (“OR”) for each characteristic. The OR is the ratio
between the odds of plaintiff’s success with a certain case characteristic to the odds
of success without that characteristic. See generally J. Martin Bland & Douglas G.
Altman, Statistics Notes: The Odds Ratio, 320 BMJ 1468 (2000), available at http://
www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/320/7247/1468 (further explaining odds ratios).
If a variable has no effect on case outcomes, the probability of plaintiffs’ success
will be the same for both groups of judges, and the odds ratio would be 1.0. Departures from 1.0 in either direction indicate an association between that variable and
case outcomes. An odds ratio greater than 1.0 indicates an increased likelihood that
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the logistic regression analyses shown in Table 2 compare the outcomes
for plaintiffs of each race in this general way and also in head-to-head
comparisons of plaintiffs’ races. Asian American plaintiffs were dropped
from this analysis because of their comparatively small sample size. The
analyses indicate that the success rate of Hispanic plaintiffs as compared
to other plaintiffs is very significant (p=.007). The logistic regression
analyses predict that Hispanics plaintiffs are 2.32 times more likely to succeed than others, or in the inverse, that others are .43 times less likely to
succeed.36 More particularly, the relationship between Hispanic and African American plaintiffs helps most explain this Hispanic plaintiff advantage (p=.01).

plaintiffs will be successful and an odds ratio less than 1.0 indicates an increased
likelihood that plaintiffs will be unsuccessful.
The inverse of the odds ratios can also be calculated, by dividing the odds ratio
(OR) number into 1. Thus, while an OR of 2.0 indicates the outcome is twice as
likely to occur, an OR of 0.50 means it is one-half as likely to occur (or mathematically, twice as likely to not occur). Likewise, you can determine the inverse of any
OR less than 1.0 into an OR greater than 1.0 by dividing 1 by the number. However,
when you determine the inverse OR’s, you must also reverse the terms in the logistic regression model. So an OR of 0.57 for White judges versus all other judges
means that White judges are .57 times less likely (or 43% less likely) to rule favorably than other judges. By transposing the OR, you can say that other judges are 1.75
times more likely than White Judges to hold for plaintiffs.
Since some judges heard multiple cases, a statistical concern is whether these
overlapping cases affect the outcomes. In other words, does the judge’s ruling in
one case affect the rulings in subsequent cases? To handle this possibility, we utilized both logistic regressions and Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) models.
A GEE model is used to fit a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) when we know that
there may be some unknown correlation present in the model. They are similar to
logistic regressions and are used often for nested models where the correlation may
exist in the natural grouping of data (in this study, one judge with multiple cases).
The results of both the logistic regressions and the GEE were almost identical. We
can assume that, since we saw very similar results in the logistic regressions and the
GEEs that the grouping of plaintiff within judge did not influence the outcome of
the analyses. In other words, the potential dependencies among the judge’s decisions did not surface. Since the GEE results take into account the potential dependencies, we reported them in the tables rather than the logistic regression results.
However, we use the term “logistic regression” in the text because it is a more
familiar term and because the results in this study are so close as to be
interchangeable.
We also performed a measure of the overall explanatory power of each model.
We calculated Nagelkerke’s generalized R2 as a measure of the overall explanatory
power of each fitted model. R2 represents the proportion of the variance in case
outcome explained by the variables in the model alone. N.J.D. Nagelkerke, A Note
on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination, 78 BIOMETRIKA 691, 691–92
(1991).
36. For the reader’s convenience, the OR and inverse OR are provided in Table 2. Keep
in mind that when using the inverse, the reader must also reverse the order of the
groups being compared, as explained in supra note 35.
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TABLE 2. PLAINTIFFS’ RACE
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS

AND

JUDGES’ RACE: ODDS RATIOS

AND

Inverse
Significance
Odds Ratios Odds Ratios
Levels
Plaintiffs’ Race
African American plaintiffs vs. all others

0.73

(1.37)

Hispanic plaintiffs vs. all others

2.32

(.43)

0.007**

White plaintiffs vs. all others

1.23

(.81)

0.56

Hispanic plaintiffs vs. White plaintiffs

1.72

(.58)

0.22
0.47

White plaintiffs vs. African American plaintiffs

1.30

(.77)

Hispanic plaintiffs vs. African American plaintiffs

2.25

(.44)

0.19

.01*

Judges’ Race
African American judges vs. all others

2.90

Hispanic judges vs. all others

0.63

(1.6)

(.34)

0.35

001**

White judges vs. all others

0.57

(1.8)

0.04*

White judges vs. Hispanic judges

1.30

(.77)

African American judges vs. White judges

2.91

(.34)

0.001**

.60

African American judges vs. Hispanic judges

3.80

(.26)

.02*

**<0.01
* <0.05

Discussion of Plaintiffs’ Race. The most apparent question from these findings on plaintiffs’ race is: Why do Hispanic plaintiffs, and to a lesser extent White plaintiffs, fare so much better than African American and
Asian American plaintiffs? Alternative explanations are possible, although some are more plausible than others.37
One simple explanation might be that different racial groups bring
different quality of cases to the court. Following this reasoning, Hispanic
plaintiffs, for some reason, may bring stronger cases, while African Americans and Asian Americans may bring weaker cases. Given the large
number of cases brought by African American plaintiffs, it is possible that
they bring a broader range of cases than other groups, including some
percent of weaker cases that bring down the overall quality of their cases
in the aggregate. Or perhaps African American and Asian American
plaintiffs are more sensitive to what they perceive as racial slights, thus
misinterpreting workplace behavior and seeing racial animus when it
does not exist. Perhaps Hispanic plaintiffs, recognizing they have an uphill battle with these kinds of legal claims, proceed with lawsuits only
when their harassment is blatantly egregious and racist. Or perhaps they
37. Another possible albeit unlikely explanation involves statistics. The results could be
a function of the number of cases for each group. Since 74% of the plaintiffs are
African American, they heavily influence the average. Since all other groups bring
only 6% to 14% as many cases as African Americans, a statistical anomaly may be
occurring. However, this study used stringent, conservative, statistical testing that
accommodates for smaller numbers and large discrepancies between the numbers
in each group, so there is only a very small chance that the results are a statistical
aberration. In future studies where the number of cases for all the racial groups
would be larger, this possible explanation can be tested.
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have more skilled lawyers who more successfully maneuver through the
justice system.
The problem with attributing these disparate racial outcomes to the
quality of the cases is that, as far as the authors know, no evidence exists
that plaintiffs of a particular race bring weaker or stronger cases or that
lawyers for particular racial groups are more legally sophisticated or
knowledgeable about the law. Instead, all plaintiffs, regardless of color,
have to satisfy the substantial administrative steps that precede bringing
a lawsuit,38 and their lawyers are presumably comparably aware of the
difficulties in these types of claims.
Another possible explanation for these findings is that judges are less
sympathetic to some groups. Given the long history of African Americans’ claims of discrimination, perhaps judges are weary of their complaints, or judges believe African American plaintiffs exaggerate or
improperly attribute supervisors’ conduct to racial bias. Judges may find
it difficult to reconcile Asian Americans’ image as the model minority
with their claims of being victimized in the workplace, thereby viewing
their complaints as less credible.39 Asian American and African American
plaintiffs are also the most physically different than the White judges,
accentuating insider-outside distinctions.40 And perhaps Hispanic plaintiffs look more like White judges, prompting an unconscious sense of
common identification.
B. Judges’ Race Matters
Given the numerical dominance of White federal judges, not surprisingly, White judges heard over 80% of the 473 total cases. African American and Hispanic judges heard a smaller number of cases, but the
numbers were large enough to study statistically. Asian American judges
heard too few cases to study statistically and so were dropped from further analysis.41
The statistical analyses indicate that judges of different racial and ethnic groups have different decision-making patterns. Simply put, the race
of the judge matters in predicting how these racial harassment cases turn
out. As shown in Table 1, descriptive and chi-square analyses found that
African American judges were the most likely to hold for the plaintiffs;
plaintiffs were successful in 42.2% of their cases before African American
judges compared to the plaintiffs’ baseline success rate of 22.2%. In con38. See Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping, supra note 21, at 55–63.
39. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 179, 189–91 (2010) (further discussing this possibility).
40. For further discussion of in-group preferences, see infra text accompanying note 59.
Also, as mentioned when interpreting the effect of plaintiffs’ race, supra note 36, this
interaction between judges and plaintiffs might result from statistical anomalies.
Thus, it is possible albeit unlikely that if every combination of judges and plaintiffs
had hundreds of cases, then this race-matching effect could disappear. Once again,
though, the stringent statistical testing used here would suggest that this statistical
anomaly is not occurring.
41. See Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 39 (discussing the possible relationship between the absence of Asian American judges and the low success rates of Asian
American plaintiffs in racial harassment cases).
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trast, plaintiffs had comparatively worse outcomes before White judges
with a 20.6% success rate, and before Hispanic judges with a 15.6% success rate. These differences among case outcomes on the basis of judges’
race are statistically significant (p=.01), meaning that these differences
would occur by chance only 1 in 100 times. The difference between African American judges and all other judges (p-.001) primarily drives the
overall result.
To test the robustness of the findings from the chi-square analyses described above, logistic regression analyses on judges’ race also were conducted.42 As shown in Table 2, results of the logistic regression analyses
confirm the significance of judges’ race. These statistical results are primarily attributable to significantly different decision making patterns between African American judges and other judges (namely Hispanic and
White judges) (p=.001). The odds ratio (OR) predicts that plaintiffs coming before African American judges are 2.9 times more likely to be successful than before other judges. Logistic regressions also indicate the
inverse: other judges are .3 times less likely to hold for plaintiffs than
African American judges.43 Similarly, but slightly less statistically significant, White judges are .6 times less likely to rule for the plaintiffs than all
other judges, or stated in the inverse, other judges are 1.8 times more
likely to rule for the plaintiffs than White judges (p=.04).
The race-to-race analysis in Table 2 indicates that African American
judges are 2.9 times more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs than White
judges (p=.0001), or inversely, that White judges are .3 times less likely to
rule for plaintiffs than African American judges (p=.0001). Consistent
with some earlier research on race-related discrimination cases,44 the findings here show that African American and White judges have contrasting
decision making patterns, with African American judges more likely to
hold for the plaintiffs.
Note, furthermore, that contrary to what a “monolithic minority
judge” model would suggest, African American judges and Hispanic
judges had significantly different decision making patterns (p=.02), with
African American judges 3.8 times more likely to hold for the plaintiffs, or
in the inverse, that Hispanic judges are .3 times less likely to hold for the
plaintiffs. Also striking, the analysis shows that White and Hispanic
judges do not have significantly different decision making patterns
(p=.60). Thus, whether plaintiffs have a White judge or a Hispanic judge
appears not to have significant consequences in the outcomes of racial
harassment cases.
While the focus in this study is on the judges’ race in relation to case
outcomes, the judges’ age, experience, political affiliation, and gender also
were briefly examined. As shown in Table 1, neither the judges’ age nor
their years of judicial experience appear to affect case outcomes. Judges
who held for or against plaintiffs had similar ages (mean of 60.2 years
versus 60.7 years) and experience levels (12.9 years versus 12.4 years).
42. See supra text accompanying note 35 (explaining logistic regressions).
43. See supra text accompanying note 35 (explaining inverse ratios).
44. See supra note 14.
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Judges who were appointed by a Democratic president (“Democratic”)
and those appointed by a Republican president (“Republican”) have almost identical decision making patterns.45 Finally, the gender of judges
also does not appear to make a meaningful difference in case outcomes
(with female judges holding for plaintiffs 22.9% of the time versus 22.0%
of the time for male judges).46
Discussion of Judges’ Race. A plaintiff-employee typically sues on the
basis of several events that have occurred in the workplace. The judge
must decide if these events are isolated and unrelated or, instead, form a
pattern constituting racial harassment and creating a hostile work environment. Some judges connect the dots between the events, while others
do not.
It could be that White judges as a whole are less likely to connect the
dots. Or, they discount some of the dots, explaining them away as typical
workplace behavior or an insensitive form of humor that is not race-related or serious. In contrast, African American judges may be more inclined to connect the dots. They see these numerous events as
contributing to the same end, namely, creating a hostile work environment based on race. In their view, these events are not isolated; rather
they are pieces of an overall picture of discriminatory conduct. They are
also more likely to give credence to subtle stereotyping of minority
groups, such as “coded” statements linked to stereotyping of racial
minorities.47
While not clear why White and African American judges might have
these different inclinations, one possible explanation is that White judges
are less likely to have personally experienced or even observed racial harassment in their own lives. In this sense, they are naı̈ve about the entire
phenomena. In the same way that a judge’s military experience, family
business, or Ivy League education may provide some context in relevant
cases, so would a judge’s experience as a racial minority.48 Thus, in American society, African American judges have more probably been targets of
45. Since judges’ party affiliation did influence outcomes in our previous research, logistical regressions were conducted to substantiate the insignificance of judges’
party in this study (p>.05). Our earlier study covered a twenty-six year period
from 1976 to 2002. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 1158–59. This current study
included more recent cases between 2002 and 2008. It could be that more recently
appointed judges are more politically neutral than in earlier years. The federal judicial process, beginning with the Senate Judiciary Committee and continuing in the
full Senate, has become filled with political landmines in the last ten to fifteen years.
Both Democrats and Republicans are on the lookout for anyone who is too far left or
too far right. This process might weed out judges who will vote predictably conservative or liberal. These middle-of-the-road judges may be neutralizing a political
affiliation effect.
46. See Pat K. Chew, Judges’ Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 359 (2011) (summarizing research on effect of judges’ gender in employment discrimination cases).
47. See Chew, Seeing, supra note 21, at 198–206 (describing social science research on
more subtle, coded forms of racism).
48. As described by former Justice John Paul Stevens: “I’ve confessed to many people
that I think my personal experience has had an impact on what I’ve done. Time and
time again, not only for myself but for other people on the court, during discussions
of cases you bring up experiences that you are familiar with.” Adam Liptak, At 89,
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race-related behavior during their lives (whether it be taxi drivers refusing to pick them up, strangers insulting them with racial slurs, or supervisors crediting their achievements to affirmative action rather than their
merits). Simply stated, African American judges could be much further
up the learning curve of what constitutes racial harassment than their
White counterparts.
These experiential-based differences are consistent with a study of
federal appellate court cases dealing with race-related voting rights disputes.49 This study found that all-White judicial panels rule less favorably
for plaintiffs in these cases than panels with at least one African American
judge. One explanation is that the African American judge facilitates at
least one of her or his White colleagues’ understanding of how to see the
dots and the resulting racial discrimination pattern.50 In other words, the
White judge with the assistance of an African American colleague moves
up the racial harassment learning curve in her or his efforts to more accurately interpret the law.
The current study also reveals that African American judges and Hispanic judges have distinct decision-making patterns, confirming that
there is no monolithic minority judge decision-making pattern in these
cases. It could be that Hispanic judges are more socially and politically
conservative than African American judges, and hence more inclined to
find for employers than for employee-plaintiffs or to interpret employment discrimination laws narrowly.51 Consider, for example, that Republican President George W. Bush appointed more Hispanic judges than
judges from other minority groups put together.52 It could be that these
conservative tendencies are more salient for Hispanic judges than the tendency to identify with other minorities’ racial discrimination. It could
also be that the life experiences of Hispanic judges on the federal bench
are more like those of White judges than those of African American
judges. Thus, some Hispanic judges’ combination of political conserva-

49.
50.
51.

52.

Stevens Contemplates Law, and How to Leave It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, at A1 (summarizing an interview with Justice Stevens).
Cox & Miles, supra note 14, at 34–37 (discussing a study of judicial decision making
in racial disenfranchisement cases).
Another factor may be that when an African American judge is present, White
judges become more “politically correct” so as to not be seen as biased, or worse, as
racist.
The political views of Hispanics in the United States of course are diverse, dependent in part on their original countries of origin. Those from Cuba, for instance,
have been characterized as more anti-Black in their political activities, while those
from Puerto Rico have more in common with Blacks. Mark Sawyer, Racial Politics in
Multiethnic America: Black and Latina/o Identities and Coalitions, in NEITHER ENEMIES
NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 265, 265 (Anaani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Obler eds., 2005). See also Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:
COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 189 (2d ed. 2006) (finding same patterns among those of Cuban and Puerto
Rican backgrounds); Mireya Navarro, For Many Latinos, Racial Identity is More Culture Than Color, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/
us/for-many-latinos-race-is-more-culture-than-color.html (describing Latinos/as’
varied cultural backgrounds).
See supra note 8. See also Manning, supra note 14 (finding that Hispanic judges are
more likely to make decisions associated with politically conservative ideologies).
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tism and social backgrounds might help explain a disinclination to connect the dots in African American employees’ complaints of racial
harassment.
This finding that there is no monolithic minority judge is a reminder
to be careful about over-generalizing about an individual judge’s decision-making. In the same way that there is no monolithic minority judge,
there is no monolithic African American or White judge. The study’s
findings describe the tendencies of the aggregate group of judges of a
certain race, but they are not determinative of what a particular individual judge will do.
C. Judges’ Race and Plaintiffs’ Race Interact
Parts III.A and III.B consider judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race separately. This section takes the analysis one logical step further by concurrently exploring the relationship between judges’ race, plaintiffs’ race, and
case outcomes.
The analysis begins with a simple description of the rulings of judges
of each race by plaintiffs of each race53:
White Judges
Success By Plaintiff Groups (Total N)
African American
Asian American
Hispanic
White

18.9% (296)
6% (18)
32.5% (40)
28.2% (38)

African-American Judges
Success By Plaintiff Groups (Total N)
African American
Asian American
Hispanic
White

46.9%
0%
60%
16.7%

(32)
(2)
(5)
(6)

Hispanic Judges
Success By Plaintiff Groups (Total N)
African American
9.5% (21)
Asian American
0%
(3)
Hispanic
50%
(6)
White
0%
(2)
This description, on its face, suggests that outcomes for plaintiffs of a particular race vary depending on the race of their judges. For example, African American plaintiffs had a success rate of 47% before African
American judges, but notably lower success rates before Hispanic judges
(9.5%) and White judges (19%). In another example, plaintiffs’ success
rate before White judges varies depending on the plaintiffs’ race: the suc53. This summary includes only cases where information on both the judges’ race and
the plaintiffs’ race was available, while Table 2, infra, includes cases where judges’
race and plaintiffs’ race was available but not necessarily both.
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cess rate ranged from Asian Americans with the lowest success rate (6%)
to Hispanics with the highest success rate (32.5%). Given the small total
number of Asian American (N=23) plaintiff cases and their extremely
low number of successes (N=1 or 4.3%), they are excluded from subsequent analyses.54
Another way to look at these results is to compare cases with judges
and plaintiffs of the same race (“same-race” pairings such as White
judges and White plaintiffs or African American judges and African
American plaintiffs) with cases that have judges and plaintiffs of different
races (“different-race” pairings such as White judges and African American plaintiffs or African American judges and Hispanic plaintiffs). This
comparison allows us to gauge the general tendency of judges of one racial group to hold for the plaintiffs of their own racial group. Given that
the baseline success rate for all plaintiffs is 22.2%, the comparisons between same-race paired cases and different-race paired cases indicate numerous deviations from that baseline.
First and most notably, Hispanic plaintiffs succeed at the highest rates
in front of every judge group (African American judges 60%; Hispanic
judges 50%; White judges 32.5%), which helps account for their overall
success rate of 37% discussed earlier. Second, White and African American judges rule much more favorably for plaintiffs of their own race
(same-race pairings) than of another race, with White judges and White
plaintiffs at 28%; and African American judges and African American
plaintiffs at 47%. Third, different-race pairings (excluding Hispanic plaintiffs who are treated most favorably by all judges) have success rates
lower than the baseline (White judges and African American plaintiffs at
19%; African American judges and White plaintiffs at 17%; Hispanic
judges and White plaintiffs at 0% or African American plaintiffs at 9.5%).
Logistic regressions once again determined if these differences were
significant or instead explainable as chance occurrences. The results in
Table 3 confirm the importance of same-race versus different-race pairings. Comparing the outcomes of same-race pairings with all other cases
(Model 1), the odds of success are 2.38 times higher (p=.001). In other
words, if plaintiffs go in front of a judge of the same race, then they are
notably more likely to win; conversely, in different-race pairings, plaintiffs are more likely to lose.

54. While the number of cases is also not high for some of the remaining plaintiff and
judge groups (African American and Hispanic judges, Hispanic and White plaintiffs), it is large enough to perform statistical analyses and to observe some tentative
general patterns.
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TABLE 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELING
PLAINTIFFS’ RACE COMBINATIONS
Combinations of Variables
Model 1:
Same-race pairings vs. all others
Model 2:
Judges’ Race
•African American judge vs. White judge
•Hispanic judge vs. White judge
•African American judge vs. Hispanic judge
Plaintiffs’ Race
•White plaintiff vs. African-American plaintiff
•Hispanic plaintiff vs. African American plaintiff
•White plaintiff vs. Hispanic plaintiff

OF

JUDGES’ RACE

AND

Odds Ratios
2.38

2.93
0.70
4.19
1.24
2.32
0.53

Sig. Level
0.001**
0.004**
0.002**
0.46
0.01*
0.03*
0.57
0.009**
0.17

Model 3:
Judges’ Race
•African American judge vs. White judge
•Hispanic judge vs. White judge
•African American judge vs. Hispanic judge
Plaintiffs’ Race
•White plaintiff vs. African American plaintiff
•Hispanic plaintiff vs. African American plaintiff
•White Plaintiff vs. Hispanic Plaintiff

0.62
2.38
0.26

0.22
0.34
0.23
0.08
0.01*
0.34
0.007**
0.02*

Same-race pairings vs. all others

2.68

0.03*

1.55
0.53
2.96

** <0.01
* <0.05

Finally, a statistical method called multiple logistical regression modeling allows the concurrent consideration of multiple variables (judges’
race, plaintiffs’ race, and matched-race pairings) combined in various
ways to see if and how they interact to affect case outcomes.55 Thus, as
shown Table 3 (Model 2), when judges’ and plaintiffs’ race are considered
concurrently (the model analyzes the interactive effects of both variables
simultaneously), both factors significantly affect outcomes with judges’
race significance at p= .004 and plaintiffs’ race significant at p= .03.56
When considering all three variables (judges’ race, plaintiffs’ race, and
same-race pairings) concurrently, as shown in Table 3 (Model 3), the importance of plaintiffs’ race (p=.01) and same-race pairings (p=.03) is
55. David W. Hosmer & Stanley Lemeshow, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 70–79 (2d ed.
2000). By testing multiple variables simultaneously in this way, we can evaluate
whether each characteristic has a statistically significant relationship with case outcome, while controlling for all other variables. Logistic regressions also provide a
unified framework in which to examine and test interaction effects, which indicate
whether two (or more) variables together have an effect different than would be
expected from knowledge of their individual effects alone. Finally, we tested for
statistical interactions between variables in the logistic regression models — that is,
whether the effect of each variable on case outcome depends in magnitude and/or
direction of the value of another variable. Further information on the models is
available from the authors.
56. Within judges’ race, the primary driver is how African American judges rule differently from the other two groups. African American judges are 2.9 times more likely
to rule for the plaintiffs than White judges (p=.002) and 4.2 times more likely than
Hispanic judges (p=.03). Meanwhile, Hispanic plaintiffs are 2.32 times more likely
to receive a favorable ruling than African American ones (p=.009).
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highlighted and the importance of the judges’ race as a single variable
lessens (p=.22). Further analysis of each same-race and different race
pairing (e.g., White judges and White plaintiffs, White judges and African
American plaintiffs, White judges and Hispanic plaintiffs, etc.) further
reveals what is occurring.57 Judges of all racial groups favor Hispanic
plaintiffs over all other racial groups. This preference is particularly significant for African American judges.58 After that, however, judges favor
their own racial group over the remaining racial groups.59
Discussion of Judges’ Race and Plaintiffs’ Race. When examining the impact of judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race on case outcomes, two important
questions arise: What explains why race-matching makes such a difference? Why do Hispanics get favorable treatment from all judicial groups?
First, recall that race-matching of judges and plaintiffs had a strong
effect on outcomes. That is, all racial groups have better outcomes when
they appear in front of a judge of the same race than when compared to
all the cases as a whole. In addition, White judges are less likely to hold
for African American plaintiffs than White plaintiffs; African American
judges are less likely to hold for White plaintiffs than African American
plaintiffs; and Hispanic judges treat both Whites and African Americans
less favorably than Hispanics.
In-group versus out-group dynamics might explain much of this finding.60 Simply put, judges of each racial group can more readily identify
with injustices that happen to their racial group. They draw upon similar
life experiences; they know how they would react to being treated in certain ways; and they understand all the subtle “coded” words that carry
racial offenses but that others tend to dismiss with “that’s not what I was
saying — you’re reading into it.” Likewise, their race antennae are up for
signals that affect their group, while they miss or discount what happens
to out-groups. A White judge might interpret the expression “White men
can’t jump” as a racist remark, while other judges would see it as a movie
reference. Similarly, an African American judge might hear the expression “lazy Tom” as reminiscent of the history of slavery, while a nonAfrican American judge might consider the phrase a colloquial expres57. The complete results of this three-factor logistical regression analysis are not provided here, but are available through the authors
58. African American judges are 2.3 times more likely to rule in favor of Hispanic plaintiffs than African American ones (p=.009). See supra note 57.
59. Hispanic judges are 2.3 times more likely to rule in favor of Hispanic plaintiffs than
African American ones (p=.0009), and African American judges are likely to rule in
favor of Hispanic plaintiffs, see id. While the data indicates that White judges are
more likely to rule in favor of White plaintiffs than African American ones, and
African American judges are more likely to rule in favor of African American plaintiffs than White ones, these results were not statistically significant.
60. See HENRY GLEITMAN, ALAN J. FRIDLUND & DANIEL REISBEG, PSYCHOLOGY 382–84 (Jon
Durbin ed., 6th ed. 2004) (discussing group stereotypes and in-group favoritism); see
generally Mina Cikara et al., Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy, 20(3) CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 149 (2011) (finding that the suffering of members in
out-groups elicits less empathic responses, as compared to the suffering of members
in in-groups); Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006) (discussing relationship between
in-group bias and implicit stereotypes).
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sion that just happened to be used to describe an African American employee. As discussed above, group membership provides a “lens”
through which judges see the dots (or not) and connect them (or not).
In addition, the effects of different-race pairings more negatively impact African American plaintiffs as a group. White judges hear 84% of
the cases and African American plaintiffs bring 74% of the cases. Their
intersecting cases represent 63% of all cases and 85% of all African American plaintiff cases. Although African American judges produce more
favorable outcomes for African American plaintiffs than any other judge
group, it is not enough to offset the effect of White judges’ rulings on
African American plaintiffs. Similarly, White judges hear 83% of all
White plaintiff cases, so Whites benefit disproportionately from the
matched-race effect.
Second, the findings indicate that all judicial groups treat Hispanic
plaintiffs favorably relative to other groups. Ironically, this pattern might
also be a function of a variation of in-group versus out-group dynamics.
White judges might view many Hispanics as having European Spanish or
Portuguese origins and looking more typically White or Mediterranean.
Since White judges might not see them as racially distinct, they include
them in their “group.” At the same time, African American judges might
see Hispanics as fellow minorities who suffer similar discriminations as
African-Americans. These judges are conscious of the ill treatment all
minorities receive in American society. Meanwhile, Hispanic judges see
Hispanics as separate from both Whites and African Americans. Where
White and African American judges respond to Hispanics’ racial ambiguity by including them in their groups, Hispanic judges see Hispanics as a
distinct group of their own.
Since Hispanics are in the news so frequently regarding both immigration and shifting U.S. demographics, all judges also may be more sensitized to the issues facing them and their need for legal protection.
Judges might see the clamor over illegal immigration as a “coded” assault on Hispanics. Although illegal aliens come from countries all over
the world, it may appear to judges that much of the animus is unnecessarily directed at Hispanics.61 Likewise, some judges might see Hispanics
as the current wave in an American history full of similar immigration
waves. Rather than be alarmed, judges might recall their own family origins and note ancestors who entered the country (legally or illegally).
They might identify with Hispanics as fellow seekers trying to improve
their life circumstances. Their judicial rulings, then, might flow from an
unspoken desire to protect the American Dream.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary of Study and Findings
This is the first study to analyze whether the plaintiff-employees’ race
and the interaction between judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race make a differ61. For example, if a third-generation U.S. citizen of Hispanic origin is constantly singled out at work to produce valid identification to support her employability,
judges of all races might view that employer conduct as harassment.
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ence in racial harassment cases. The results indicate that outcomes do
vary depending on the plaintiffs’ race, the judges’ race, and the interactions between them. The authors’ earlier empirical study of older cases
indicated that judges of different races have different decision-making
patterns in federal, racial harassment in the workplace cases.62 This current study confirms these differing decision-making patterns in more recent district court cases (2002-2008). Furthermore, while existing
empirical research on the judges’ race and case outcomes tends to focus
only on White and African American judges, this study additionally considers Hispanic judges.
Moreover, the current study goes a step further than independently
considering the plaintiffs’ race and judges’ race. It also analyzes the interactive effects of plaintiffs’ race and judges’ race on case outcomes. Particularly, it found that judges of one race treat differently plaintiffs of their
race versus plaintiffs of other races. Why judges of any race are consciously or unconsciously disposed toward litigants of any race is unclear, but the data suggests that it does occur.
In summary, the findings confirm that both judges’ race and plaintiffs’
race can make a significant difference in racial harassment cases in the
federal courts, but not necessarily in ways one might predict:
(1) Plaintiffs’ Race. African American plaintiffs bring 74% of all
cases, so their success rate of 20.9% has a large impact on the
22% overall plaintiff success rate. African American plaintiffs
(along with Asian American ones) are more likely than other
groups to lose; correspondingly, Hispanic and White plaintiffs
are more likely to win. In practical terms, the analysis predicts
that Hispanics are 2.3 times more likely and Whites are 1.3
times more likely to be successful than African Americans.
Even with these more positive odds, keep in mind that Hispanic plaintiffs are successful in only 37% of their cases.
(2) Judges’ Race. White judges hear 84% of all cases, so their decision-making pattern (20.9% plaintiffs’ success rate) heavily influences the overall plaintiffs’ success rate of 22%. Hispanic
judges are less likely to hold for plaintiffs (15.6%). African
American judges resolve these cases differently than either
White judges or Hispanic judges with a 42.2% plaintiffs’ success rate. In practical terms, plaintiffs who come before African American judges are 2.8 times more likely to be successful
than if they come before White judges and 4.0 times more
likely to be successful than if they come before a Hispanic
judge. Even with African American judges, however, plaintiffs succeed only about 4 times in 10.
(3) Interactive Effects of Plaintiffs’ Race and Judges’ Race. The findings suggest that judges of different races perceive the complaints of plaintiffs of different races distinctively.
Interestingly, Hispanic plaintiffs get more favorable outcomes
from all judge groups. Meanwhile, race-matching (when the
62. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 1143 tbl.3, 1156–58.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HBK\28-1\HBK102.txt

unknown

RACE

IN

Seq: 23

18-SEP-12

11:18

JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING ■ 113

judge and the plaintiff are of the same race) is a strong indicator of outcomes, improving the plaintiffs’ odds of success by
2.5 times.
B. Implications
These findings raise a host of issues and implications about judges’
race, plaintiffs’ race, and their relationship to each other. First and foremost, race is related to outcomes in federal racial harassment in the workplace cases. The explanations for this are no doubt complex and not fully
understood. However, the study results do not appear to support the
formalism model of judicial decision-making, where judges’ legal analyses are considered largely a mechanical and value-neutral exercise.63
Under this model, one would expect all judge groups to rule somewhat
similarly and all plaintiff groups to have similar outcomes. One would
not expect the results from this study, including the strong effect of racematching (where judges and plaintiffs are of the same race).
Instead, as the realism model suggests,64 judicial decision-making appears to be a more complicated, and human activity where judges’ backgrounds, including their race and their conscious or unconscious worldview of other races, affect case outcomes. An interpretation of the realism
model by James Gibson and Gregory Caldiera is particularly apt.65 Judicial “decisionmaking involves far more than ‘applying’ the law to the
facts in a mechanical or syllogistic fashion,” and “inevitably involves and
implicates judges’ personal values.”66 At the same time, they observe:
[T]his is a matter of degree — to reject mechanical jurisprudence is
not necessarily to assume unfettered discretion but only to recognize that, within the context of the rule of law, judges have choices
in their decisions and that their choices often if not typically reflect
their own ideological predispositions.67
In practice, judges typically exercise discretion in a principled fashion, not
in a strategic self-interested way, thereby protecting judicial legitimacy.
They are not “merely politicians in robes.”68
These study findings also highlight the importance of further integrating the judiciary. Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson posits that a true and
63. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy
of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 201–14 (2011) (examining public perceptions about the process of judging and studying the subsequent impacts
on institutional support); Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
419, 420 (1992) (describing legal realist judges as outcome-oriented judges who believe that the law is often indeterminate, whereas formalist judges believe that most
legal questions have ‘determinate, objectively discoverable right answers’); Brian
Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1145–48 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
64. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–60 (G. Edward White
ed., 1986); Neuborne, supra note 63, at 420; Leiter, supra note 63, at 1145–48.
65. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 63, at 201–14.
66. Id. at 201.
67. Id. at 214.
68. Id.
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well-functioning democracy requires that key decision-makers in society,
such as judges, be as integrated as possible.69 Thus, a racially diverse judiciary, is more inclined to be “responsive and accountable to the just
claims of citizens from all walks of life” because “[t]hey can draw on a
more diverse pool of information about the asymmetrical effects of public
policies on different citizens, and are more likely to modify decisions in
lights of information, than homogeneous elites.”70
Referring to experiments with mock juries, Anderson cites evidence of
the benefits of decision-making groups with racial diversity versus those
who are all White.71 Racially integrated juries are more conscientious and
have higher quality deliberations. They consider more facts and issues,
are less likely to make inaccurate statements, and are more likely to correct errors. Moreover, these initiatives are spurred by both White and
African American members of the group.
Research on integrated versus all-white judicial appellate panels also
reveals differing decision-making processes. Namely, appellate panels
with at least one African American judge are more likely than all-White
panels to agree with the plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination.72 These
findings suggest two phenomena. First, African American judges, like African American jurors, are influencing their White colleagues, presumably
by sharing their insights on what race discrimination is and how to detect
it in modern American society. Second, they suggest that White judges,
like White jurors, are open to learning from their African American colleagues. Presumably, such peer influence and openness to learning can
also occur when the roles are reversed. Thus, White judges can help
judges of other races better understand discriminatory conduct against
Whites;73 Hispanic judges can help judges of other races better understand discriminatory conduct against Hispanics, and so on. If judges of
all races help each other see race-related cases through their group’s
“lenses,” then plaintiffs of all colors would get the fairest hearing of their
complaints. Moreover, a more racially diverse judiciary might prompt
judges to be more self-conscious and learn more about their own biases
and stereotypes that affect their judicial decisions.74 In particular, they
could examine their in-group leanings and out-group skepticism.
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 127–34 (2010).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 130–31.
See Cox & Miles, supra note 14, at 4 (“When a white judge sits on a panel with at
least one African American judge, she becomes roughly 20 percentage points more
likely to find a section 2 violation [of the Voting Rights Act].”). Social science research also suggests that more contact among members of different racial groups
increases empathy and trust between races. See, e.g., Gordon Hodson, Do Ideologically Intolerant People Benefit From Intergroup Contact?, 20(3) CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 154 (2011) (reviewing research indicating that intergroup contact and
friendships work well among intolerant and cognitively rigid person, by reducing
threat and anxiety and increasing empathy, trust, and out-group closeness).
73. See, e.g., Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as Zero-Sum
Game That They Are Now Losing, 6(3) PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 215 (2011) (studying Whites’
increasing concern about anti-White bias).
74. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 31, at 334–38 (discussing how correcting an individual’s impressions, including unconscious racial stereotypes, requires three condi-

69.
70.
71.
72.
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In conclusion, our study results indicate that judges of different races
have different decision-making patterns; that plaintiffs of different races
have differing outcomes; and that judges are more likely to be persuaded
by plaintiffs of their same race. Consistent with a “principled discretion”
version of a realism model of judicial decision-making, it appears that the
life experiences of judges of different races result in different relevant
“pools of information” that have real-world consequences for plaintiffs
of different races in racial harassment cases. Given the dominant number
of White judges, their “pools of information” and resulting perspectives
are most likely to set the norms. The Obama administration’s pattern of
appointing more minority judges has both symbolic and substantive
value. A more integrated judiciary that is representative of American society would expand judicial perspectives, prompt a more deliberative
process, and help assure more accountable and responsive decision-making for “citizens of all walks of life,” thus facilitating a more fully-functioning democracy.

tions: the individual’s motivation, cognitive resources (time, spare processing
capacity), and “information from which a reasoned corrective judgment might be
made”).

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HBK\28-1\HBK102.txt

unknown

Seq: 26

18-SEP-12

11:18

